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In 1922, an infanticide statute was enacted in England and Wales. The Infanticide Act 
1922 was later amended in 1938 to accommodate the killing of infants up to the age of 
12 months, allowing a woman who wilfully killed her infant to be charged with/convicted 
of infanticide, an offence akin to manslaughter in terms of seriousness and punishment, 
notwithstanding that she would otherwise be guilty of murder, provided that at the time of 
killing the balance of her mind was disturbed by the effect of childbirth or lactation.1 The 
Irish Parliament followed suit in 1949. The Infanticide Act 1949 drew extensively on the 
English example, allowing a woman who murdered her infant to be tried for/convicted of 
infanticide where she “by any wilful act or omission caused the death of her child” aged 
under 12 months while “the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not 
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect 
of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child”.2 Where a woman was sent for trial 
for or convicted of infanticide she would be tried and punished as if she had been 
                                                 
* A version of this paper has been accepted for publication by the Irish Jurist and will be published in 
volume 50: see K. Brennan, “‘Traditions of English Liberal Thought’: A History of the Enactment of an 
Infanticide Law in Ireland” (2013) 50 Irish Jurist at 100-137.  
1
 Infanticide Act 1922 (12 & 13 Geo. V. c.18); Infanticide Act 1938 (1 & 2 Geo. VI. c.36). 
2
 Infanticide Act 1949 s.1(3). The Infanticide Act 1949 was amended in the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 
2006 s.22(a). The reference to lactation was dropped from the provision and replaced with a reference to 
mental disorder. The Irish infanticide measure now provides that the offence/defence of infanticide will be 
available where a woman kills her infant while the balance of her mind is disturbed by reason of her not 
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of a mental disorder … 
consequent upon the birth of the child. A mental disorder is defined by s.1 of the 2006 Act as including 
mental illness, mental disability, dementia or any disease of the mind, but does not include intoxication. 
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charged with or convicted of manslaughter.3 Importantly, this meant she would be tried 
at the Circuit Criminal Court, a court of lower criminal jurisdiction, and would be subject 
to a flexible sentencing regime with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Numerous 
other jurisdictions have adopted similar measures.4  
Drawing on evidence found in archival court and government records,5 this article 
explores a number of matters connected with the enactment of the infanticide law in 
Ireland. The historical record indicates that the enactment of the Irish statute was an 
uncontroversial affair. Irish lawmakers adopted the English infanticide framework with 
little opposition. In this regard, two key issues are explored. The first question 
considered is whether any particular objections to following the English legislative model 
were expressed during the drafting or the parliamentary stages of the reform and, in 
connection with this, whether alternative proposals for dealing with the issue of 
infanticide were offered or considered. The records indicate that the only issue that 
attracted particular attention in the Irish context, and which did ultimately lead to a 
deviation from the English law, was that of the importance of ensuring that the proposed 
legislation would not diminish the value of infant life or, in connection with this, the 
deterrent effect of the criminal law. This issue is explored in depth. 
                                                 
3
 Infanticide Act 1949 s.1(3). This was amended by the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 s.22(b) so that 
infanticide is now punishable under s. 6(3) of that Act as if the offender had been found guilty of 
manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility.  
4
 For example Canada, Hong Kong, Fiji, New South Wales and Victoria have all enacted similar measures.  
5
 The following sources dealing with the infanticide reform were consulted at the National Archives of 
Ireland (“NAI”): Attorney General Office file (infanticide) 2000/10/2921; Attorney General Office file 
(infanticide) 2000/10/2922 (“AG 2000/10/2921”; and “AG 2000/10/2922”); Cabinet Minutes 2/10; 
Department of Justice file (infanticide) 8/144/1 (“DJ 8/144/1”); Department of Justice file (infanticide) 
8/144/A (“DJ 8/144/A”); Department of Justice file (infanticide) H266/61(“DJ H266/61”); Department of 
Taoiseach file (capital punishment) s7788(a) (“DT s7788(a)”); Department of Taoiseach file (insanity) 
s13311 (“DT s13311”); Department of Taoiseach file (infanticide) s14493 (“DT s14493”); various 
Department of Taoiseach files on commuting the death sentence (“DT (CDS)”). The following court 
records were also consulted: Court of Criminal Appeal files (“CCA”); State Books for the Central Criminal 
Court (“SBCCC”). Material relating to the infanticide reform found in the Archives of the Archbishop of 
Dublin was also consulted: Archives of Archbishop of Dublin, The McQuaid Papers, AB8/B/XVIII/10 
(“AAD, AB8/B/XVIII/10”). This research also makes use of the parliamentary debates on the enactment of 
the infanticide law in Ireland: 115 Parliamentary Debates cols 263–283, April 18, 1949 (Dáil Éireann); 36 
Parliamentary Debates cols 1470–1477, July 7, 1949 (Seanad Éireann).  
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The second matter connected with the legislative response to infanticide in 
Ireland that is considered in detail is the mitigating rationale contained within the 1949 
statute. The Irish Infanticide Act 1949 enshrined verbatim the medical basis of the 
English infanticide law, namely that a woman could be convicted of infanticide if at the 
time of killing her infant the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not 
having fully recovered from the effect of childbirth or by reason of the effect of lactation 
consequent upon childbirth.6 The historical sources consulted indicate that the 1949 
statute was enacted without consideration of the mental disturbance mitigation provided 
for in the measure. In this regard, the Infanticide Act 1949 is assessed against feminist 
critiques of infanticide laws based on the English model. It will be argued that the 
legislative history behind this measure shows that the feminist assessment of infanticide 
statutes which adopt the English medical approach to this crime has limited relevance in 
the Irish context, and, in particular, that the Irish perception of infanticide mitigation was 
broader than what is suggested by these critiques. The reasons for adopting, with such 
little reflection, the English medical rationale, and the likely meaning and scope of this 
rationale in the Irish context, are also explored.  
In the following section, the phenomenon of infanticide in Ireland during the first 
three decades of independence will be explored with reference to the prevalence of this 
offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the characteristics of the 
typical infanticide offender. Following on from this, the criminal justice response to the 
crime of infanticide will be examined, focusing on how women charged with murdering 
                                                 
6
 Although a literal reading of infanticide statutes based on the English model of 1938 indicate that it is not 
necessary to prove that this disturbance caused the woman to commit the act in question by impairing her 
responsibility in a specific way, such as by affecting her ability to make sound judgments or exercise self-
control, it seems there is an implicit presumption that the woman’s “disturbance in the balance of the mind” 
was sufficiently connected to her criminal act so as to reduce her responsibility: see N. Walker, Crime and 
Insanity, vol.1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), pp.134–135. As noted, the medical rationale 
of the infanticide legislation has since been amended in Ireland to cover mental disorders consequent upon 
childbirth: see n.2 above.  
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their infants were disposed of at the Central Criminal Court. Problems stemming from 
the law and practice, and the background reasons for reforming the law in this area, will 
be briefly noted. The legislative response to infanticide will then be examined, focusing 
in particular on the matters outlined above.  
 
I. Infanticide in Ireland, 1922–1949 
I.i Prevalence 
Infanticide, particularly when it involves the killing of neonates after a concealed 
pregnancy, is not an easy crime to detect,7 which makes it difficult to provide a reliable 
figure for its incidence in Ireland during the first decades of independence. It seems, 
however, that by the 1920s infanticide had long been on the decline in Ireland. O’Donnell 
found that the rate of “baby killing” fell significantly in the mid-nineteenth century in the 
immediate aftermath of the Great Famine, with this trend continuing thereafter, though at 
a less dramatic pace.8 Official crime figures provided by the Central Statistics Office 
(hereafter CSO) indicate that 135 infant murders (defined as the killing of an infant aged 
                                                 
7
 See L. Rose, Massacre of the Innocents: Infanticide in Britain 1800–1939 (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1986), pp.23, 35–39; R. Sauer, “Infanticide and Abortion in Nineteenth Century Britain” 32 
Population Studies 81 at 82, 85–87, on the difficulties involved in ascertaining the incidence of infanticide 
in nineteenth-century Britain. See also, A. Wilcynski, Child Homicide (London: Greenwich Medical 
Media, 1997), ch.2, on the “dark figure” for infanticide in contemporary criminal statistics. Detection of 
infanticide in Ireland during this period did not always begin with the discovery of the dead body of an 
infant. In her study of court records, Rattigan found that a “considerable number” of investigations into 
possible infanticides in Ireland in the first half of the twentieth century began before the victim’s body had 
been discovered. Indeed, local gossip and the willingness of the community to report their suspicions to the 
local police, along with proactive policing of women suspected of infanticide, played a crucial role in the 
detection of infanticide crimes in Ireland during this period: C. Rattigan, “‘I Thought from Her Appearance 
That She Was in the Family Way’: Detecting Infanticide Cases in Ireland, 1900–1921” (2008) 11 Family 
and Community History 134–151; C. Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?” Single Mothers and Infanticide, 
Ireland 1900–1950 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2012), ch.4; C. Rattigan,“‘Dark Spots’ in Irish Society: 
Unmarried Mothers and Infanticide in Ireland from 1926 to 1938” in M.C. Ramblado-Minero and A. Pérez-
Vides (eds), Single Motherhood in Twentieth Century Ireland: Cultural, Historical and Social Essays 
(Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), pp.95–96. See also, L. Ryan, “The Press, Police and 
Prosecution: Perspectives on Infanticide in the 1920s”, in A. Hayes and D. Urquhart (eds), Irish Women’s 
History (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2004), p.145. 
8
 I. O’Donnell, “Lethal Violence in Ireland, 1841 to 2003” (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology at 
676–681.  
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under one year) were recorded during the years 1927–1949 inclusive (see Table A), an 
average of six cases per annum.9  
Although in the broader historical context infanticide was a diminishing concern, 
its incidence possibly appeared more significant to contemporary observers, especially 
when compared to other murders. The homicide rate for non-infant killings also fell in the 
years following the famine, and during the first four to five decades of independence 
Ireland experienced its lowest rates of homicide of persons aged over one year.10 For 
the period 1927–1949, the CSO records 167 murders of persons aged over one year 
(see Table A). When compared with the figure for non-infant murders, it is evident that in 
certain years the number of reported infanticides was higher than or equal to other 
recorded murders (see Table A). For example, in 1927 there were 19 reported cases of 
the murder of infants aged one year and under, and only nine reported murders of 
persons aged over one year. For example in 1937, 1939 and 1945 the number of 
murders reported for these two categories were equal. When expressed in terms of a 
percentage of the total number of murders for this period, the incidence of infanticide 
appears more significant, accounting for 44.7 per cent of all murders recorded by the 
CSO.  
Ryan suggests, from her review of newspaper reports during the 1920s and 
1930s, that infanticide was “a monthly if not a weekly reality” in the Irish Free State.11 
When concealment of birth charges, which would normally have been tried at the Circuit 
Criminal Court, are taken into consideration, infanticide crimes would certainly have 
appeared prevalent. The CSO records 856 concealment of births between 1927 and 
1949 (see Table A). The offence of concealment of birth, provided for by s.60 of the 
                                                 
9
 See Central Statistics Office, Annual Abstracts 1927–1949. Statistics are not provided for the years prior 
to 1927.  
10
 O’Donnell, “Lethal Violence in Ireland” at 677–678.  
11
 L. Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish Press (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), p.262. 
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Offences Against the Person Act,12 has an important relationship with infant murder, 
particularly in cases involving dead neonates. The s.60 misdemeanour criminalises the 
mere concealment of the dead body of an infant and is available even where the victim 
was born dead and/or had died of natural causes.13 Historically, this offence provided a 
very useful alternative charge (after 1861)14 or conviction where the evidence failed to 
establish murder (or manslaughter), or where, due to sympathy for the accused, it was 
thought inappropriate to subject her to a capital trial or conviction.15  
A number of the concealment cases recorded in the CSO figures may have been 
undetected homicides where, for example, decomposition of the remains or insufficiently 
advanced medical techniques made it impossible to ascertain the cause of death. Thus, 
infanticide, both when compared to other murders and when the incidence of 
concealment of birth is accounted for, was something the courts were confronted with on 
a fairly regular basis. Indeed, Rattigan notes that Irish trial judges frequently commented 
on the prevalence of infanticide, and she suggests that the “moral climate” of post-
independence Ireland may have particularly highlighted infanticide as being a cause of 
concern.16  
 
I.ii The infanticide offender 
                                                 
12
 24 & 25 Vic. c.100. Section 60 provides: “If any woman shall be delivered of a child, every person who 
shall, by any secret disposition of the dead body of the said child, whether such child died before, at, or 
after its birth, endeavour to conceal the birth thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being 
convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding 
two years.”  
13
 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.60. 
14
 Prior to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the offence of concealment of birth was governed by 
Ellenborough’s Act (43 Geo. III. c.58, s. 3) and the Offences against the Person Act 1828 s.14 (9 Geo. IV. 
c.31). 
15
 D. Seaborne Davies, “Child Killing in English Law”, in L. Radzinowicz and J.W.C. Turner (eds), The 
Modern Approach to Criminal Law (London: Macmillan, 1945), pp.312-315; A.R. Higginbotham, “‛Sin of 
the Age’: Infanticide and Illegitimacy in Victorian London” (1989) 32 Victorian Studies at 331–332; Sauer, 
“Infanticide and Abortion in Nineteenth-Century Britain” at 82; K.J. Kramar, Unwilling Mothers, 
Unwanted Babies: Infanticide in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), ch.1.  
16
 Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?”, p.52. 
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Infanticide was mainly committed by Irish women during this period for the purpose of 
avoiding the unwanted consequences of an illicit sexual relationship.17 The typical infant-
murder case appearing at the Central Criminal Court during the first three decades of 
independence involved a woman who had concealed her pregnancy and given birth 
alone, killing the child at or very soon after birth.18 The offender was, in the vast majority 
of cases, the mother of the victim, an unmarried woman in her mid-twenties.19 In 
general, the woman acted alone; although other persons, including the mother’s siblings, 
parents and grandparents were occasionally implicated.20 In addition, although there 
were cases where the father of the infant was charged, these were the exception; 
fathers were rarely involved in the pregnancy, the birth or, consequently, the killing.21  
In a society which insisted on female virtue, and which was intolerant of 
illegitimacy,22 unmarried mothers in Ireland during this period faced myriad difficulties 
with few solutions. As Earner-Byrne has noted: “In the Irish ‘social order’, the concept of 
illegitimacy extended in practice, if not in name, to the unmarried mother: she was an 
illegitimate mother.”23 An unwed pregnancy and birth would, in the vast majority of 
cases, have been an intensely shameful experience for a woman, inviting social 
disgrace and possibly other disastrous personal consequences which potentially 
                                                 
17
 For accounts of infanticide in the Irish Free State, see generally: Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?”, 
ch.1; A. Guilbride, “Infanticide: The Crime of Motherhood” in P. Kennedy (ed.), Motherhood in Ireland 
(Cork: Mercier Press, 2003), pp.170–180; Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish Press, ch.6; Ryan, 
“Perspectives on Infanticide”, pp.137–151; Rattigan, “Unmarried Mothers and Infanticide in Ireland”  at 
83–102.  
18
 Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?”, ch.1. 
19
 Ibid. p.40. 
20
 For accounts of cases involving other persons, particularly family members, see: Rattigan, “What Else 
Could I Do?”, Ch.2; C. Rattigan, “‛Done to Death by Father or Relatives’: Irish Families and Infanticide 
Cases, 1922–1950” (2008) 13 The History of the Family at 370–383; Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish 
Press, pp.282–286. 
21
 Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish Press, p.253.  
22
 See generally, J.J. Lee, “Women and the Church since the Famine,” in M. MacCurtain and D. ÓCorráin, 
(eds), Women in Irish Society: The Historical Dimension (Dublin: Arlen House, 1978), pp.37–45; R.M. 
Rhodes, Women and Family in Post Famine Ireland: Status and Opportunity in a Patriarchal Society (New 
York & London: Garland, 1992), esp. ch.3. 
23
 L. Earner-Byrne, Mother and Child: Maternity and Child Welfare in Dublin, 1922–1960 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007), p.172. 
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included loss of employment (especially if she worked in domestic service), familial 
anger and rejection, homelessness and social ostracism.24 Poverty was also a factor in 
many infanticide cases, not only because it meant the woman would have been unable 
to take advantage of other options, such as, for example, emigration,25 an illegal 
abortion, or a secret birth at a private maternity home followed by a private adoption, but 
also because it would have been difficult to provide for both herself and her baby after 
birth, particularly if without family support.26 As has been historically the case 
elsewhere,27 there appears to have been a strong correlation between domestic service 
and infanticide in Ireland.28  
Concealment of pregnancy and birth was a key aspect of this crime. As Rattigan 
notes, the accused woman had usually gone to great efforts to hide her condition from 
her family, friends, employer, and community, usually, though not always, giving birth 
alone without medical assistance.29 The death of the infant tended to be a continuation 
or a consequence of the woman’s efforts to disguise the fact that she had been pregnant 
and had given birth in culturally unacceptable circumstances. Thus, illegitimacy, 
                                                 
24
 See Guilbride, Infanticide, pp.171–172. 
25
 On use of emigration by pregnant unmarried women, see L. Ryan, “Irish Newspaper Representations of 
Women, Migration and Pregnancy outside Marriage in the 1930s” in M.C. Ramblado-Minero and A. Pérez-
Vides (eds), Single Motherhood in Twentieth Century Ireland: Cultural, Historical and Social Essays 
(Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), pp.109–118; L. Ryan, “‘A Decent Girl Well Worth 
Helping’: Women, Migration and Unwanted Pregnancy” in L. Harte and Y. Whelan (eds), Ireland Beyond 
Boundaries: Mapping Irish Studies in the Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2007), esp. pp.142–
150; Guilbride, “Infanticide”, p.178. 
26
 See generally, Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?”, pp.38–45,54–62; Ryan, “Perspectives on 
Infanticide”, p.145.  
27
 See generally, R.W. Malcolmson, “Infanticide in the Eighteenth Century” in J.S. Cockburn (ed.), Crime 
in England 1550–1800 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1977), pp.192–193, 202–206; F. McLynn, Crime and 
Punishment in Eighteenth Century England, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp.111–112; J.M. Beattie, Crime 
and the Courts in England 1600–1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.114; J.A. Sharpe, Crime 
in Early Modern England 1550–1750 (London: Longman, 1984), p.110; L. Gowing, “Secret Births and 
Infanticide in Seventeenth Century England” (1997) 156 Past and Present 92; W.L. Langer, “Infanticide: A 
European Survey” (1973) 1 History of Childhood Quarterly 357.  
28
 Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?”, p.41, 57–58: 92 women out of the 102 cases in which information 
on employment was available (in a sample of 195 infanticide cases) were domestic servants. See also Ryan, 
Gender, Identity and the Irish Press, p.269 
29
 Rattigan, “What Else Could I Do?”, pp.65–69. See also Ryan, “Perspectives on Infanticide”, p.141; 
Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish Press, pp.254–255, 267. 
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concealment and murder tended to be very closely associated. The criminal justice 
response to infanticide in Ireland during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s will be explored in 
the following section. 
 
II. The Irish Criminal Justice Response to Infanticide 
Prior to the enactment of the Infanticide Act 1949, the law made no special provision for 
women who murdered their infants. Like other convicted murderers, they were subject to 
a mandatory death sentence unless a reprieve was issued by the Governor General or, 
after 1937, by the Irish President.30 However, in practice, women who murdered their 
infants were dealt with far more leniently than was advocated by the strict letter of the 
law. The archival records considered in this research indicate that, despite the fact that 
between 1922 and 1949 women regularly appeared at the Central Criminal Court on 
charges of murdering their “newly” or “recently born” infants, only 10 women were 
actually convicted of the capital offence in connection with infanticide during this period; 
the death sentence was commuted in each case.31  
It is evident from the records that jurors, judges and prosecutors all favoured a 
lenient outcome in infanticide cases. The State Books at the Central Criminal Court 
show that at least 160 mothers appeared at the Central Criminal Court on an infant-
murder charge during the period 1924 to 1949.32 Of the 157 cases proceeded against, 
only 45 were disposed of on the basis of a jury verdict. Jurors usually acquitted or 
                                                 
30
 See G. O’Brien, “Capital Punishment in Ireland, 1922–1964,” in N. Dawson (ed.), Reflections on Law 
and History: Irish Legal History Society Discourses and Other Papers, 2000–2005 (Dublin: Four Courts 
Press in association with the Irish Legal History Society, 2006), pp.227–228, 236. 
31
 This conclusion is based on an survey of the following sources: NAI: DT s7788(a), Returns of Persons 
Sentenced to Death, 1922–32 and 1932–37; Index to Department of Taoiseach files; DT (CDS); SBCCC, 
IC-88-59 (October 1924–April 1925, Dublin City); IC-88-61 (June 1925–December 1926, Change of 
Venue Cases Dublin); IC-88-60 (June 1925–June 1927, Dublin), ID-33-68 (November 1927–June 1933); 
ID-24-129 (February 1928–November 1943, City of Dublin); ID-11-92 (November 1933–April 1941), ID-
27-1 (October 1941–December 1945), V15-4-15 (February 1946–December 1952). See also NAI: DT 
s14493, Department of Justice memos dated January 4, 1944 and February 10, 1949.  
32
 This figure excludes women appearing at the Central Criminal Court on charges of manslaughter or 
concealment of birth during this period.  
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convicted of a non-capital offence. Only eight (five per cent of the total sample) of the 45 
cases tried before a jury in this sample of 160 maternal infant-murder cases at the 
Central Criminal Court resulted in a conviction; one woman was found guilty but insane; 
26 women (57.8 per cent of those tried) were acquitted; and 10 women were convicted 
of either concealment of birth or manslaughter.33 Where the jury convicted of murder 
they always recommended mercy; judges consistently supported the jury’s 
recommendation for a reprieve.34  
It seems that prosecutors favoured dealing with these cases on the basis of a 
plea of guilty to a less serious offence. One hundred and twelve cases in this sample (70 
per cent) were disposed of on the basis of a guilty plea to either manslaughter (62 
cases), concealment of birth (47 cases), or the statutory offences of child abandonment 
or cruelty (three cases).35 The practice of dealing with these cases on a guilty plea 
became more entrenched from the mid-1930s onwards, and, indeed, in the years 
immediately prior to the enactment of the 1949 Act, every woman in this sample who 
had been charged with murdering her infant had a plea of guilty to a non-capital offence 
accepted.36 It also seems that for “motives of humanity” the Attorney General often tried 
to avoid charging women suspected of infanticide with murder, using his discretion to 
charge with the concealment offence where the medical evidence was sufficiently 
ambiguous to allow this; however, where there was evidence of violence against the 
                                                 
33
 Two cases involving convictions against women who murdered their infants that are listed on the Return 
of Persons Sentenced to Death are not found in the SBCCC. See NAI: DT s7788(a), Returns of Persons 
Sentenced to Death, 1922–32 and 1932–37. These returns list nine cases of maternal infanticide; the tenth 
case involving a capital conviction against a woman for the murder of her own infant (KO, 1943) is found 
in NAI: SBCCC ID-27-1 (October 1941–December 1945).  
34
 NAI: DT s7788(a), Returns of Persons Sentenced to Death, 1922–32 and 1932–37. 
35
 Children’s Act 1909 s.12.  
36
 Between 1945 and 1949, 20 women appeared at the Central Criminal Court on a murder charge related to 
the death of their infant. Every one of these women pleaded guilty to either manslaughter or concealment of 
birth; the plea was accepted by the State. See NAI: SBCCC ID-27-1 (October 1941–December 1945); V15-
4-15 (February 1946–December 1952). For a more detailed discussion, see K. Brennan, “‘A Fine Mixture 
of Pity and Justice’: The Criminal Justice Response to Infanticide in Ireland, 1922–1949” (2013) 31(4) Law 
and History Review at 793-841.  
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infant, the Attorney General had “no option” but to proceed against the “unfortunate” 
woman on the capital charge.37 It seems that, in the latter group of cases, the state 
prosecutor tried to avoid a murder trial and conviction by accepting a guilty plea to a 
non-capital offence at the Central Criminal Court. 
It appears, therefore, to have been generally accepted that maternal infanticide 
should not be treated as a capital offence. To circumvent the severity of the existing law, 
an ad hoc form of lenient justice was practised in the Irish courts which ensured that 
women were rarely convicted of murdering their infants, and were never executed for 
this crime.38 Evidence found in government files connected with the infanticide reform of 
1949 indicates that both pragmatic and emotional factors influenced the lenient 
approach taken in cases of maternal infanticide.39 As noted, juries rarely convicted and 
the death sentence was never carried out. It was, therefore, considered both “futile” and 
“painful” to put “young girls” and “unfortunate” women who killed their infants through the 
“ordeal” of a capital trial.40 It was also costly from a resource perspective to charge 
women suspected of killing their infants with murder because this meant that the 
accused had to appear, with witnesses, at the Central Criminal Court in Dublin, even 
where it was clear to everyone involved that she would not be convicted of that 
offence.41 In essence, the entire process for dealing with these cases was a “tragic 
farce”.42 It is evident from government files that those involved in dealing with these 
cases sought a more efficient and humane way to deal with maternal infanticide.43 In 
                                                 
37
 NAI: DJ 8/144/1, memo addressed to the Minister for Justice accompanying the Infanticide Bill 1949, 
dated February 1949.  
38
 For more detail see generally, Brennan, “A Fine Mixture of Pity and Justice”. 
39
 See generally, ibid. 
40
 See generally, NAI: AG 2000/10/2921, memo from Attorney General to Department of Justice, dated 
March 28, 1941; DJ 8/144/1, memo addressed to the Minister for Justice accompanying the Infanticide Bill 
1949, dated February 1949.  
41
 NAI: DJ 8/144/1, memo addressed to the Minister for Justice accompanying the Infanticide Bill 1949, 
dated February 1949.  
42
 Ibid.   
43
 Brennan, “A Fine Mixture of Pity and Justice”. 
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short, from both a practical and a humanitarian perspective, it was necessary to 
formalise the customary justice being doled out in the courts.44 The legislative response 
to these problems is discussed in the following section. 
 
III. The Legislative Response to Infanticide in Ireland 
The possibility of introducing a legislative measure on infanticide in Ireland was first 
raised in the Department of Justice in 1928 by Mr S.A. Roche. Roche, then Assistant 
Secretary of the Department, requested that consideration be given to the 1922 English 
Infanticide Act, stating: “we might profitably enact an identical measure.”45 Four years 
later, Roche wrote to the new Fianna Fáil Minister for Justice, James Geoghegan, again 
recommending consideration of the 1922 Act,46 and advising the Minister to see whether 
his “informal committee” would assist in getting a similar measure passed.47 
Interestingly, Mr Roche titled the memo “Re our social legislation”, which perhaps 
suggests that the issue of infanticide was not viewed as a truly criminal matter by the 
Department. In 1941, a judicial committee, the “Committee appointed to Consider and 
Report on the Law and Practice relating to Capital Punishment” (hereafter the O’Sullivan 
Committee),48 which had been tasked with reviewing the law on capital punishment,49 




 NAI: DJ H266/61, note dated July 31, 1928. The file contains a copy of the Infanticide Act 1922 and the 
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (19 & 20 Geo. V. c.34). 
46
 Roche also suggested that the Infanticide Life (Preservation) Act 1929 be considered. However, there 
seems to have been no subsequent discussion about introducing that statute in Ireland. 
47
 NAI: DJ H266/61, note titled “Re our social legislation”, dated December 13, 1932. 
48
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recommended that infanticide be subject to law reform, pointing to the English infanticide 
statute of 1938 as the legislative model.50 This paved the way for legislative action. 
The O’Sullivan Committee did not further elaborate on the infanticide proposal in 
its report, omitting to identify any particular problems with the law in this area or its 
reasons for recommending reform. Perhaps it was assumed that the Minister for Justice 
and his Department were already cognisant of the difficulties with the existing law. As 
noted above, government files connected with the infanticide reform and the 
Parliamentary debates on the 1949 Bill indicate that sending a woman to the Central 
Criminal Court on a murder charge when it was evident she would most likely not be 
convicted of that offence, and would certainly not be subject to the capital penalty, was 
problematic because it wasted court resources, could be said to turn the trial process 
into a sham, and caused “unfortunate” women and “young girls”, and other persons 
involved in these trials, unnecessary distress.51 Essentially, the Infanticide Act 1949 was 
brought in to formalise the ad hoc lenient practices at play at the Central Criminal Court 
and, in so doing, to avoid the unwelcome consequences of this customary justice.52 
The O’Sullivan Committee made no additional suggestions with respect to 
abolishing the death penalty for murder, and, aside from recommending reform of the 
insanity defence, stated it was of the view that the law on murder should not be 
amended as it presented no difficulties for trial judges or juries.53 The Secretary of the 
Department of Justice, Mr Roche, who argued in favour of more radical reform, with a 
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possible abolition of the death penalty for all non-political murders, criticised the 
O’Sullivan Committee on the ground that it had been “unduly cautious”.54 He stated that 
“in the majority of cases the law is too harsh and indiscriminating”.55 Noting that a 
reprieve was granted in three out of every five capital convictions,56 Roche advised that 
this would be “more striking” had the Attorney General and juries not made efforts to 
“mitigate the severity of the law” in many cases.57  
There appears, however, to have been little appetite among relevant officials for 
a more fundamental reform of the sentence for murder, and, indeed, the O’Sullivan 
Committee had been prevented from considering a wider abolition of the death penalty.58 
In the historical context, twenty or so years after the establishment of a new State 
followed by a civil war, it is perhaps not surprising that the prevailing view was that a 
more extensive review of the death penalty would not be countenanced. Indeed Roche, 
despite his criticisms of the O’Sullivan Committee’s recommendations, concluded his 
comments on the report by stating that the Department of Justice was of the opinion that 
it would not be prudent to completely abolish the death sentence, especially in regard to 
“political murder”.59 Arguably, however, infanticide was a unique and inherently private 
offence committed by a particular group of offenders against a particular group of victims 
and could, perhaps, be distinguished from other murders on the basis that it posed no 
danger to the public order and political stability of the fledging Irish nation.60  
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The death penalty was still the mandatory punishment for murder in England, 
which left little precedent for a wider abolition of the sentence for this crime. A more 
fundamental reform along these lines would have been a bold and radical move. 
Treating infanticide as a non-capital crime, at least in certain prescribed circumstances, 
was not, however, a novel idea, and Irish reformers could take comfort in the fact that 
the infanticide proposal essentially involved the implementation of a law which had been 
long established in England as an effective response to this crime. Further, as noted, 
there was a deeply entrenched custom of circumventing murder trials and convictions 
and of commuting death sentences in cases of maternal infanticide. No woman had 
been executed for killing her infant, at least since the foundation of the Irish Free State, 
and indeed for many years prior to independence.61 An infanticide measure along the 
lines proposed could be easily justified on the basis that it simply gave “statutory 
authority to what [wa]s already the practice”.62  
In January 1944, the Minister for Justice, Mr Boland, in consultation with the 
Attorney General, agreed that the recommendation of the O’Sullivan Committee with 
respect to infanticide should be followed, and approval was given by the Cabinet to 
proceed along these lines.63 The Infanticide Bill seems to have caused little difficulty 
during the drafting stages, presumably because there was a legislative precedent to 
follow. The draft Infanticide Bills prepared during the 1940s followed the key aspects of 
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the English legislative example, applying to cases where the victim was aged under 12 
months and allowing mitigation where the balance of the woman’s mind was disturbed 
by reason of the effect of childbirth. The earlier drafts did not contain a reference to 
lactation consequent upon childbirth, which was inserted into the 1949 version as a 
justification for applying the provisions to the killing of infants up to the age of 12 
months.64 The final Bill that was introduced in the Dáil in April 1949 had also been 
subject to one other change. In March, at the request of the Cabinet, a new provision 
(s.1(1)) was inserted which related to the procedure for proceeding against a woman on 
an infanticide charge. This new subsection implied that infanticide could not be charged 
in the first instance: a woman could be sent forward for trial for infanticide only where 
she had first been indicted for murder and where the district judge at the preliminary 
investigation determined that the charge should be reduced.65  
The Infanticide Bill passed through the Dáil and Seanad without amendment. It 
seems to have been viewed as an uncontroversial measure as it passed through both 
Houses. Indeed, only one Dáil Member spoke out against the Bill,66 and although minor 
criticisms and suggestions were offered by other speakers in both Houses, these 
generated little discussion. The Infanticide Bill was enacted into law in July 1949.67  
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The question whether Irish lawmakers considered other options during the 
drafting stages of the infanticide reform, and the extent to which they modified the 
English model to suit the Irish context, is considered in the following section. The 
evidence in the records shows that the only issue to have given Irish reformers any 
particular concern was that of ensuring that the proposed law would not interfere with the 
sanctity of infant life. This matter received particular attention during the drafting stages 
of the reform, resulting, it seems, in a consultation with one prominent member of the 
Catholic Church, and, ultimately, to the inclusion of a new provision in the Irish measure 
which was aimed at ensuring that the infanticide statute would not diminish the value of 
infant life or the deterrent effect of the law.  
 
IV. Special Considerations in the Irish Infanticide Reform 
The Irish legislature adopted the English approach to infanticide, making it a separate 
homicide offence akin to manslaughter in punishment seriousness and rationalising the 
lenient approach taken on the basis that at the time of the killing the balance of the 
woman’s mind had been disturbed as a result of the effects of childbirth or lactation. In 
this regard, it appears that Irish lawmakers showed little legislative imagination. They did 
not consider alternative options when considering the infanticide reform, adopting the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2) Where, upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child  under the age of twelve 
months, the jury are satisfied that she is guilty of infanticide, they shall return a verdict of infanticide. 
(3) A woman shall be guilty of felony, namely, infanticide if –  
(a) by any wilful act or omission she causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of 
twelve months, and 
(b) the circumstances are such that, but for this section, the act or omission would have amounted 
to murder, and  
(c) at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not 
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of 
lactation consequent upon the birth of the child  
and may for that offence be tried and punished as for manslaughter. 
(4) Section 60 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, shall have effect as if the reference therein to 
the murder of any child included a reference to infanticide.  
2. This Act may be cited as the Infanticide Act, 1949.” 
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English approach without question.68 Possibly reformers felt bound to follow the 
O’Sullivan Committee’s recommendation to consider the English law as the legislative 
model, though it also seems plausible that they simply lacked the initiative or interest to 
propose a novel approach to infanticide when there was an effective and well-
established legislative precedent to follow.  
The only suggestion of hesitance in government files on the infanticide reform 
about the suitability of the English law in the Irish context came from the Secretary of the 
Department of Justice, Mr S.A. Roche, who, on initial consideration of the O’Sullivan 
Committee Report in 1941, wrote to the Office of the Attorney General expressing 
reservation about the infanticide recommendation.69 Roche considered that the English 
law’s “meticulous pathological phrases about ‘the effect of birth’ and ‘the effect of 
lactation consequent upon birth’ would sound strange in the Dáil”.70 He also complained 
that the English approach was “too narrow” because it excluded cases where the victim 
was aged over one year, situations where mothers killed from “despair or anger”, and, 
referring to a recent case where two sisters had been convicted of murder, “young girls” 
who helped their older sisters kill their infants.71 He claimed that these cases should be 
included in the proposed mitigation framework because there was not the “slightest 
probability” that the woman or girl would be executed.72 He argued that “there seem[ed] 
to be no sense in inflicting upon her, upon the judge, upon the jury, and upon the 
Government all the distress and worry of an unreal trial for murder followed by a 
reprieve”.73 Roche favoured a “broader, more flexible, less meticulous system” than that 
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proposed.74 His views do not appear to have generated any discussion about 
alternatives more suited to the Irish context, at least of a nature which left a paper 
record.  
One other suggested alteration to the substance of the English law appears to 
have been put forward during the drafting stages of the Bill. The Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Minister for Local Government and Public Health, Dr Conn Ward,75 in a 1944 
memorandum on the infanticide reform, recommended amending the wording of the 
proposed measure to replace the phrase “the balance of the accused’s mind was so 
disturbed that” with the phrase “the accused was suffering from such a disease of the 
mind that”.76 There is no evidence that this suggestion was considered by those involved 
in drafting the Bill. Its resonance with the existing insanity defence would, presumably, 
have placed an undesirable restriction on the availability of the new provisions and 
possibly defeated the objectives of the reform.  
During the second-stage reading of the Infanticide Bill in the Dáil, Major de 
Valera, a member of the opposition Fianna Fáil party, proposed that infanticide should 
continue to be recognised as murder, but that specific provision could be made for the 
mitigation of punishment in particular cases. He suggested the trial jury could convict of 
murder with the qualification that the balance of the defendant’s mind was disturbed, as 
set out in s.1(3) of the Bill, allowing the trial judge a discretionary power with regard to 
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the sentence imposed.77 This suggestion was noted during the Committee Stage in the 
Dáil, but rejected on the basis that it would involve a “complete recasting of the whole 
Bill and a change in its title”.78 Since the principle of the Bill had been accepted by the 
Dáil, it was considered “hardly now possible, even if it were desirable” to make the 
suggested amendment.79 
 
IV.i Legislating to preserve the sanctity of infant life 
Overall, there appears to have been little interest in developing an alternative approach 
to infanticide in Ireland and, as noted, there seems to have been very little opposition to 
adopting the English law. Indeed, Major de Valera was the only member of either House 
to voice opposition to the Infanticide Bill, strongly objecting to it on sanctity of infant life 
grounds.80 He refused to accept that it was permissible to draw a distinction between the 
killing of infants and older persons, asserting that he “would recognise that the crime [of 
child killing] is murder, murder in God’s law or natural law….”.81 Although he did 
recognise that infanticide could involve varying degrees of culpability “ranging from [a] 
possible complete lack of responsibility due to complete mental incapacity to cold-
blooded, wilful and unadulterated murder”, he claimed that it would not be proper for 
Parliament to distinguish between different degrees of responsibility by classifying the 
crime as a different category of unlawful killing.82 Indeed, he argued that the “killing of a 
child should … be dealt with as a solemn and extremely serious procedure”83 and that 
the full formalities of a murder trial should apply.84 He did acknowledge, however, that a 
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mitigation of punishment could be permitted in some cases, having regard to the 
offender’s “culpability or competency”.85  
Major de Valera’s opposition to the proposed bill also appears to have been 
informed by a degree of anti-English sentiment. He cautioned overall against “traditions 
of English liberal thought”86 on the issue of infanticide and he urged the Dáil not to follow 
“the line taken in another country”, but to show that “we in this country still recognise the 
dignity and the importance of human life from the moment of conception to the grave”.87 
These comments, which seek to differentiate the Irish nation on the grounds of moral 
superiority and which question the suitability of “liberal” English developments in the 
domestic context, may reflect what historians have identified as a wider drive among 
Irish public officials to create a unique and distinctly “Irish” nation, particularly in relation 
to moral issues.88 Post-independence, the predominately male, catholic and nationalist 
administration embarked on a “nation-building” process, adopting laws and policies 
which marked the new State as “Irish” and which reflected what were assumed to be the 
common values and interests of the citizens of the newly independent State.89 Perhaps 
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what is interesting is that Major de Valera’s attitude with respect to the suitability of 
“liberal” English standards in the Irish context does not appear to have been shared by 
any of his parliamentary colleagues who spoke; nor does it appear to have been a view 
held by those involved in bringing forward this measure. Indeed, as noted, the Secretary 
of the Department of Justice actually thought that the English approach to infanticide 
would be too narrow to address satisfactorily the difficulties with this crime in Ireland.90 
It is apparent, however, that the need to appear not to weaken the law’s 
protection of infant life was an important consideration in the Irish context. When he 
introduced the Bill to the Dáil, the Minister for Justice, General MacEoin, emphasised the 
importance of legislating in a manner which upheld the sanctity of human life, 
particularly, in this case, infant life.91 He specifically drew a distinction between the 
English approach and the contents of the Irish Bill, suggesting that the 1949 measure 
would do more to protect the sanctity of infant life than the English model on which it was 
based because it implied that where a mother wilfully killed her infant the initial charge 
would be murder.92 Presumably, the Minister was pre-empting objections to the Bill on 
the sanctity of life ground, but arguably there also appears to have been a hint of Irish 
moral superiority in these comments, as well as a desire to draw attention to the fact that 
the Irish Bill did not exactly follow the English example.93 
In response to Major de Valera’s polemic attack on the Bill, the Minister for 
Justice admitted that initially he too had “very grave misgivings” that it would appear to 
“cheapen[…] … human life”, but that he was satisfied that “the sanctity of human life is 
maintained and the seriousness of the offence is not lessened”.94 He explained that the 
proposed statute was framed in such a way that it did not alter the fact that the unlawful 
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killing of an infant is murder and would be treated as such unless certain mitigating 
conditions existed.95 This was reinforced by the provision in s.1(1) which implied that the 
initial charge in cases of infanticide would always be murder.96 The Minister stressed 
that s.1 was “so worded that I did want to leave it clear that the death by malice of any 
person, whether that person was one hour, one minute, or one hundred years old, was 
murder”.97  
As noted, s.1(1), which is not found in the English law, had not been part of any 
of the original draft Bills and was inserted after the Cabinet called for a redrafting of the 
1949 proposal.98 The cabinet minutes provide no insight as to the reasons for this 
request or the nature of the changes sought. It is evident, however, given the Minister for 
Justice’s comments in the Dáil, that the purpose of this redrafting was to prevent a 
distinction being drawn in terms of relative seriousness between the murder an infant 
and that of an adult.  
 The potential difficulty with regard to the sanctity of infant life had been flagged 
in the Department of Justice prior to the Bill’s being submitted to the Cabinet for approval 
for submission to the Dáil. In particular, the Department anticipated that the Roman 
Catholic Church would “view with feelings of no great enthusiasm a proposal which may 
have the effect of cheapening human life or encouraging immorality”.99 As a result of 
these concerns, the introduction of the Bill to the Cabinet appears to have been delayed 
until the Minister for Justice and the Attorney General met with the Archbishop of Dublin, 
Dr McQuaid.100 The documents found in government and diocesan archives do not detail 
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the substance of the discussion between Dr McQuaid and the government at this 
meeting; in fact, there is no confirmation in these records that the planned meeting did 
take place. However, assuming the consultation did go ahead as planned, two 
documents found in the archives for the Archbishop of Dublin provide some indication of 
the key issues which likely arose and of the Archbishop’s stance on the infanticide 
proposal.101  
Unsurprisingly, the Archbishop probably offered strong criticism of the Bill on the 
grounds that it could reduce the gravity of infant murder in the eyes of the law and in the 
public mind, and that it would diminish the deterrent effect of the law. One of the 
Archbishop’s advisers, Monsignor Dargan, in a memorandum on the Infanticide Bill, 
sympathised with the view that infanticide was an aggravated form of murder.102 Though 
he recognised that extenuating circumstances were involved in many cases, he criticised 
the existing practice in the courts where the sentence for this crime was, without 
exception, reprieved, despite the fact that there must have been cases in the past where 
the “extreme penalty” was warranted.103 He opined that the prevailing custom of 
commuting the death sentence helped foster the notion that infanticide was not actually 
murder, but he nonetheless acknowledged that the nation would be accused of 
“barbarity” were this penalty to be carried out again in a case of maternal infanticide.104 
Dargan faulted the Infanticide Bill on the ground that it would promote the view 
that the killing of an infant was “not murder in the full sense of the term”.105 He preferred 
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that the existing law be left unchanged,106 but conceded that if compelling reasons were 
advanced in favour of enacting the proposed legislation, the wording of the Bill ought to 
be amended to explicitly label the crime murder.107 He accepted that it may have been 
an “implicit feature” of the Bill that a mother could be charged with and convicted of 
murdering her infant, and subject to the penalty for that crime, but he suggested that this 
be “made explicit, as a means of calling attention to a very important moral truth”.108  
The significance of labelling, in relation to both the deterrent impact of the law 
and the recognition of the gravity of the offence at hand, was also highlighted in another 
diocesan memorandum, most likely authored by Archbishop McQuaid or another 
member of his staff.109 The term “murder”, the author stated, has a “fearsome and ugly 
sound”, and constituted a deterrent in its own right “because its meaning is universally 
understood”.110 He argued that the proposed infanticide law might eventually foster the 
view among the public that a woman could never “murder” her infant, and that it could 
diminish the gravity of the crime in the public mind.111  
Overall, assuming the scheduled meeting did take place, it appears that the 
Archbishop probably expressed strong reservations to the Minster for Justice about the 
Infanticide Bill. However, it seems unlikely that he outright rejected the proposed 
measure or, more generally, the desirability of altering the law to make lenient provision 
for certain infanticide offenders, at least those who killed in extenuating 
circumstances.112 In light of the evidence in the diocesan records, it seems plausible that 
the Archbishop would have at least suggested that the Bill be amended to render more 
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explicit the fact that the crime at hand was murder, and would continue to be treated as 
such unless acceptable mitigation was involved.  
Further, it is likely the subsequent request by the Cabinet to redraft the Bill was in 
deference to any such misgivings. At that time, the Catholic Church wielded significant 
political influence in Ireland.113 Indeed, with independence from Britain, the architects of 
the new Irish nation frequently consulted with the Church on legislative and policy 
matters related to Catholic moral and social teaching, and although the Church’s wishes 
were not always adopted, the bishops were on occasion very influential.114 Had the 
Archbishop refused to support any measure along the lines proposed, it is quite possible 
that the Government would not only have hesitated in proceeding with the Bill, but may 
have dropped it altogether.  
Interestingly, in both of the documents referred to above, the importance of 
labelling was emphasised, and Monsignor Dargan was particularly concerned about 
ensuring that the legislation be more explicit about the fact that this crime could still be 
prosecuted as murder. In this regard, in the second diocesan document found in the 
McQuaid Papers a suggestion was made that a “better” approach to the infanticide 
problem would be to legislate to permit trial judges, at the conclusion of the evidence, to 
use their discretion to reduce the murder charge to one of manslaughter or concealment 
of birth, and for the jury to then decide the question of guilt in the normal manner.115 This 
is not dissimilar to the procedure actually adopted in s.1(1) which allows a district judge 
to alter a murder charge to one of infanticide on the basis of his assessment of the 
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evidence available at the preliminary examination. Possibly this suggestion was put 
forward by the Archbishop to the Minister for Justice and the Attorney General, and was 
then relayed to legislative draftsmen who translated it into a legally workable procedure 
that retained the key rationale of the proposed legislation and also achieved at least one 
of the purposes of the reform, the avoidance of costly and unnecessary murder trials at 
the Central Criminal Court.116 It certainly appears that s.1(1) was a good compromise 
between the need to achieve particular practical and humanitarian objectives, while 
respecting a significant aspect of Catholic, and indeed wider Christian, teaching.  
Section 1(1) essentially reaffirmed that where murder was suspected, the case 
would have to be treated as a capital offence, at least until a district justice was satisfied 
that there was good evidence on which to reduce the charge to infanticide. This 
provision was important symbolically, because it conveyed the legislature’s respect for 
infant life and also, possibly, that the Irish law would go further than its English 
counterpart in this regard.117 Section 1(1) was also undoubtedly important strategically to 
mollify potential objectors as the Bill passed through Parliament and perhaps equally, if 
not more importantly, the Catholic Church. Whether the procedure set out in s.1(1) made 
a significant practical difference to defendant women and criminal justice officials 
involved in these cases would have depended on the willingness of district judges to 
alter the charge on the basis of the evidence presented in the District Court, and also, 
possibly, on the State’s desire to have the charge reduced. In this regard, s.1(1) may 
have given rise to difficulties in connection with ensuring that appropriate evidence was 
presented at the District Court that would enable the district justice to make a 
determination about reducing the charge. This issue was highlighted in the Dáil, by 
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Fianna Fáil TD, Deputy Lynch. He objected to the procedure in s.1(1), arguing that the 
district justice would need some evidence upon which to base his decision before 
reducing the charge, and that since it was unlikely that the prosecution would produce 
such evidence, the onus would fall on the accused, who would thus be forced to 
“disclos[e] her hand”.118  
The issue raised by Deputy Lynch was further discussed during the Committee 
Stage in the Dáil. It was noted that if the prosecution was not responsible at the 
preliminary hearing for adducing evidence with regard to the mental state of the 
accused, this obligation would fall on the defendant, thus prejudicing her case at trial.119 
Further, it was noted that, where no evidence relating to the accused’s mental state was 
produced at the preliminary hearing, this would place an undue burden on the district 
judge, who, feeling unable to make his own determination, may leave it to a trial judge at 
the Central Criminal Court to decide the question of whether the offence was murder or 
infanticide.120 Since one of the objects of the Bill was to reduce “the time and expense” 
of unnecessary murder trials, such an outcome would clearly be problematic.121  
In response to these concerns it was noted that, in practice, the evidence 
“usually raise[d] a presumption” that the accused had been “mentally disturbed” when 
she killed her child, and that, in such circumstances, a district judge would “almost 
certainly call for a medical report”.122 It was observed that the Attorney General would 
introduce the necessary medical evidence where he was of the view that the woman 
was guilty of infanticide rather than murder.123 It was noted, however, that where the 
State was of the opinion that the woman’s crime was murder, it could not be expected to 
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introduce such evidence.124 In addition to this, it was observed that, in practice, the 
Attorney General would pursue a murder indictment only where he was satisfied that the 
evidence supported such a charge.125 The issue of accused women being forced to 
introduce medical evidence themselves was not dealt with directly. However, it seems to 
have been assumed that defendants would not be placed in the position of having to 
adduce evidence to support infanticide at the preliminary hearing because the Attorney 
General could be trusted to seek murder only where this was justified on the evidence, 
and because district justices would call for medical reports in other cases where the 
facts raised a presumption of infanticide.  
The history behind the Irish infanticide reform shows that the Attorney General, 
and at least the Central Criminal Court judges who sat on the O’Sullivan Committee, 
sought a better way to deal with women who murdered their infants, one which would 
not involve sending this offender to the Central Criminal Court on a farcical murder 
charge.126 As noted, the object of the Bill would have been frustrated if district judges 
failed to use their discretion to reduce the charge, and it is not implausible that the new 
law did operate on the basis of a tacit presumption in favour of reducing the charge in 
suitable cases.  
 
V. The Medical Rationale for the Infanticide Law 
Although concern about the sanctity of infant life had an impact on the framing of the 
Irish infanticide law, in other respects there appears to have been no interest in 
developing a different approach to infanticide in Ireland. This is particularly true with 
regard to the medical justification for facilitating mitigation of this crime. The Irish 
infanticide statute wholly adopted the extenuating rationale of the English infanticide law, 
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namely that the balance of the woman’s mind was disturbed by reason of the effects of 
childbirth or lactation. The rationale for lenient treatment may suggest that there was 
thought to be a link between infanticide and mental disturbance. Indeed, when 
introducing the Infanticide Bill to both Houses of the Oireachtas, the Minister for Justice 
certainly suggested that there was such a connection, and he appealed to medical 
science as a justification for the reform. He outlined the prevailing problem with the law 
relating to maternal infant murder as follows:  
 
“…[A]n unmarried mother, to take the most usual type of case, who wilfully kills 
her child is guilty of murder and liable to be sentenced to death unless she 
establishes a defence on the ground of insanity. Modern medical opinion strongly 
favours the view, however, that a woman, although not insane in the sense that 
would enable her to establish a defence on that ground … might suffer from such 
disturbance of the mind in the circumstances attendant or following on the birth 
of the child that she would not be fully responsible for her actions. In practice, for 
many years no woman has been hanged for the murder her infant child.”127  
 
However, in the Government records connected with the infanticide reform, there 
is no clear evidence to indicate that women appearing before the Central Criminal Court 
on infant murder charges were commonly mentally disturbed, or that this presented a 
key reason for reforming the law on infanticide. As noted above, the historical record 
suggests that the main reason for the infanticide reform was to avoid sending women to 
the Central Criminal Court on murder charges where it was evident that as a result of the 
circumstances in which the offence was committed a jury would not convict of murder, 
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and, where a capital conviction did result, that the death sentence would not be carried 
out.128 It is evident that the existing law was thought to be too harsh. Possibly one 
reason for the sympathetic response to this crime was that it was assumed that women 
who killed their infants had reduced culpability as a result of having experienced a 
mental disturbance in the aftermath of childbirth,129 and it may have been that the reason 
the existing law proved so problematic was that it failed to provide a formal channel for 
juries, prosecutors, and judges to recognise this mitigation. However, there is nothing in 
government files to suggest that the 1949 reform was explicitly connected with 
infanticide offenders being unable to plead mental disturbance as a defence to the 
charge of murder. Arguably, if it was thought that women who killed their infants were 
less culpable as a result of being mentally unbalanced, this was only one of many 
extenuating factors considered relevant in these cases.  
 
V.i Feminist critiques of infanticide: the Irish context 
Despite the Minister for Justice’s appeal to the authority of “modern medical opinion”, the 
Irish infanticide reform was not informed by medical expertise, except to the extent that it 
was based on the English law of 1938, which had been based partly on medical 
advice.130 In fact, it appears that the Department of Justice did not consult with medical 
experts, though it suspected that the medical profession would dispute the foundation of 
the proposed law, and, similar to what had been the experience with respect to a recent 
failed attempt to reform the law on insanity, that the Infanticide Bill would provoke 
“violent disagreement” between the legal and medical professions.131 Implicit in these 
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comments appears to be a decision to exclude medical experts from discussions on the 
Infanticide Bill. However, although there was no external consultation with the medical 
profession, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Local Government and Public 
Health, Dr Conn Ward, who was a medical doctor, did present his views of the proposed 
reform in a 1944 memorandum to the Department of Justice.132 The details of this 
memorandum are discussed below.133 For now, it suffices to say, however, that the only 
medical expertise that was apparently received during the course of preparing the 
Infanticide Bill was that tendered by a medical practitioner in his role as a Government 
official.  
The Infanticide Bill also passed through the Dáil and Seanad without any debate 
about the medical merits of the proposal or any discussion about what precisely the 
language of the Bill was intended to cover.134 In summary, no one involved in bringing 
forward or enacting this law showed any interest in the medical rationale on which it 
rested. It may have been the case that the medical basis was considered sound, with 
reliance being placed on the English legislature having scrutinised the disturbance in the 
balance of the mind rationale in 1922 and again in 1938.135 Irish parliamentarians, in 
particular, may have assumed that those involved in drafting the Irish measure had 
consulted with the relevant experts, particularly in light of the Minister for Justice’s 
comments about contemporary medical views on the issue. 
In this regard, feminist scholars claim that infanticide laws based on the English 
model “medicalise” the crime because they adopt sexist nineteenth-century “biological 
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positivist” medical theories of female deviance that explain female criminality on the 
basis of mental disturbance caused by biological experiences associated with 
reproduction.136 The medicalisation of infanticide is deemed problematic, not only 
because it promotes and legitimises the view that all women are inherently mentally 
unstable as a result of their biological functions,137 but also because it ignores the social 
and political causes of criminal behaviour.138  
Other scholars, however, have largely rejected the medicalisation account of 
infanticide laws.139 Ward claims that the 1922 legislation formally incorporated the 
“common-sense” lay understanding of infanticide that had operated in the courts in 
relation to the use of the insanity defence pre-1922 which, though at odds with medical 
theory and legal constructions, recognised the social context of the crime.140 He found 
no evidence that medical theory was considered by those who conceived, drafted and 
enacted the 1922 Act in England.141 Further, it appears that even if contemporary 
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medical theory had been considered, it would not have supported a bio-psychiatric 
understanding of infanticide.142 Indeed, Watson and Kramar’s survey of the 
contemporary mental science and ethnographic literature on the subject of infanticide 
reveals that, while there was an element of biological thinking in some of these accounts 
of maternal infant killing, this phenomenon was largely explained by both medical 
scientists and ethnographers on socio-economic grounds.143 Although the early 
twentieth-century medical literature did recognise a link between infanticides occurring 
sometime after childbirth and lactational insanity or exhaustion psychosis, a disease 
which was mainly attributed to physical exhaustion and socio-economic factors, there 
was little or no recognition of any association between puerperal mental disturbance and 
newborn infanticide.144 As Ward argues, “[f]rom a medical point of view [the Infanticide 
Bill 1922] was a curious proposal, in that it created an apparently psychiatric defence for 
precisely the category of mothers who were least likely to be considered insane”.145  
Overall, given the lack of interest in the medical basis of the infanticide reform, 
and, in particular, the lack of engagement with the medical profession, it seems that Irish 
lawmakers were similarly unaffected by bio-determinist views of infanticide. Kramar, in 
her analysis of the adoption of an infanticide law based on the English model in Canada 
in 1948, found a similar disinterest in medical theory among Canadian lawmakers.146 
She claims that the Canadian legislature “unwittingly operationalised a crude retention of 
psychiatric theories” which accounted for infanticide in biomedical terms.147 Rather than 
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being a “well thought out appropriation of sexist psychiatric knowledge”, the medical 
basis of the Canadian infanticide measure provided “at most, a helpful rationalisation” for 
the reform, enabling the legislature to address the practical problem of how to prosecute, 
convict and sentence in cases of maternal infanticide, without infringing basic tenets of 
individual responsibility.148 It seems that Irish reformers could be accused of the same 
approach to legislating on this difficult criminal justice matter.  
 
V.ii Justifying differential treatment of the infanticide offender, presumptions of 
mental disturbance, and assessing the scope of the medical rationale 
 
Overall, as argued in the previous section, Irish reformers and legislators displayed a 
complete lack of interest in the medical rationale of the infanticide legislation. The 
reasons for adopting the English approach to infanticide were not discussed in the 
records consulted. Medical evidence on the role of mental disturbance in cases of 
maternal infanticide and the impact of the processes of childbirth and lactation on a 
woman’s mental state were not considered; nor was the meaning of the medical 
mitigation provided for in the proposed infanticide law explored. In this section the likely 
reasons for adopting the English medical model of infanticide and the perceived scope 
of the infanticide mitigation are explored.  
The English rationale for mitigating infanticide probably appealed to Irish 
reformers for two reasons. First, it provided a neat justification for differential treatment 
of these killers. Dr Conn Ward, in his 1944 memorandum on the planned infanticide 
reform, had opined that “emotional disturbances” caused by “love, jealousy, fear of 
discovery of a disgraceful secret, etc.” could “produc[e] an altogether unbalanced mental 
state which unhinges the mental process of control, but [which] falls short of what a jury 
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man would look upon as a disease of the mind”, in other words legal insanity.149 He 
considered that a mother who gave birth to an unwanted child, if not suffering from the 
“comparatively rare” condition of puerperal insanity, could “scarcely be held to be so 
very different from that of other types of criminals who at the time of committing the 
crime [were] suffering from intense emotional disturbance”.150 Thus, failing to find any 
distinction between the mother who killed her infant and other emotionally disturbed 
killers, Dr Ward concluded that if the killing of a “helpless baby” was to be treated as 
seriously as that of an adult, it would not be possible to give the “baby slayer … any 
special consideration”.151 Indeed, he noted that certain aggravating features may be 
apparent in these cases, namely that the woman involved was sometimes a “hardened 
sinner” who had killed with “full deliberation”.152 He did observe, however, apparently as 
a means of finding some distinguishing criterion, that it could “always be argued that [the 
woman who killed her young infant] had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth 
to her child”.153 It appears, therefore, that Dr Ward’s advice to legislators was that 
although the cause of the emotional disturbance in cases of infanticide was not childbirth 
itself but the difficult circumstances in which this occurred, the effects of recent birth 
could be utilised to justify more lenient treatment of these killers over other similarly 
disturbed offenders.  
This, of course, highlights the challenge that faced any legislature seeking to 
treat women who killed their infants while in a distressed state more leniently than other 
killers whose responsibility might be similarly mitigated, and thus the appeal of the 
medical rationale: how to facilitate a lenient response for the infanticide offender without 
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opening the floodgates to other killers or interfering with fundamental criminal law 
principles in relation to individual responsibility.154 The adoption of a rationale for 
mitigation which appeared to be based on the recent biological experiences of the 
accused, experiences which were closely connected with her crime, both temporally and 
emotionally, helped to avoid these problems. Thus, as Dr Ward seemed to advise, 
although childbirth itself may not have had a special or unique connection to mental 
disturbance, the fact that the woman had recently given birth could serve to differentiate 
her from other murderers who had experienced similar emotional disorders: her act of 
murder could be distinguished on the basis that she had killed in the context of a recent 
birth.  
The second likely reason for the appeal of the medical rationale is that it may 
have reflected commonly held assumptions about the mental state of infanticide 
offenders, and the supposed connection between childbirth and mental disturbance. As 
noted above, it was observed during the Committee Stage in the Dáil that cases of 
infanticide would often raise a presumption of mental disturbance.155 There is other 
evidence in the historical records consulted that women who killed their infants were 
commonly believed to have been mentally disturbed at the time of the offence. For 
example, during the second stage debate in the Dáil, Deputy Boland opined that in most 
infanticide cases “the woman was in a frenzy or … her mind was disturbed”.156 The 
author of one of the documents dealing with the infanticide reform found in the McQuaid 
Papers also partly excused newborn infanticide on the basis of a presumed mental 
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imbalance.157 The author considered that no woman feels an “immediate maternal 
solicitude” for her infant at birth, her “natural and powerful maternal instinct” being 
aroused only after she had cared for the child and “realised its complete dependence on 
her”.158 He concluded that it was “understandable”, therefore, that the first instinct of a 
“wretched woman” who had given birth to an unwanted child may be to “get rid of it”, 
claiming that if he were a trial judge in such a case, he would have sympathy for the 
accused and would “assume” that she had “acted on an impulse … at a time when her 
mind was unbalanced or deranged”.159 On the other hand, the author considered that a 
woman who killed her infant after having cared for it over a number of months would 
need to present “positive evidence of her mental derangement” in order to earn any 
mercy.160  
Although findings of insanity were very rare in cases of infanticide,161 there is 
evidence in some of the court records consulted that the mental state of women accused 
of murdering their infants did sometimes arise when these cases were dealt with at the 
Central Criminal Court.162 In some instances it seems that evidence of mental 
disturbance was tendered in an effort to support an insanity plea; in other cases, the 
supposed unbalanced mental state of the accused postpartum arose for consideration in 
                                                 
157
 McQuaid Papers, AB8/B/XVIII/10: Document 2. 
158
 Ibid.  
159
 Ibid.  
160
 McQuaid Papers, AB8/B/XVIII/10: Document 2. 
161
 Overall, there were very few insanity verdicts in infanticide cases during this period. In the sample of 
160 cases examined in this study, only one insanity verdict was returned (2.2 per cent of those tried); and 
one woman was found unfit to plead. See above text at n.33. Rattigan, in her sample of 195 Irish infanticide 
cases for the period 1922–1950 (“What Else Could I Do?”, p.204, Table 2), found three cases where the 
accused was found guilty but insane (1.5 per cent of the sample). 
162
 This conclusion is based on a survey of the following sources: CCA files which contain a copy of the 
trial transcript (only available in cases involving appeals); DT (CDS). An examination of State Files at the 
Central Criminal Court in every case of maternal infanticide may provide a more complete picture of the 
extent to which the mental state of the accused arose for consideration. However, given that the majority of 
cases did not go to trial, there is likely to be little to be gained in terms of understanding the role played by 
mental disturbance in these cases.  
 39 
other ways. For example, at the trial of one woman for the murder of her newborn infant, 
the trial judge in his jury summation stated:  
 
“…[E]veryone knows … that the bringing of a child into the world is accompanied 
very often … with great pain and suffering to the woman. Some of them become 
demented by it —some of them are not so upset.… Well now, … even if [the 
defendant] is exaggerating these pains she must have been in a rather 
distressed condition—I mean—one would infer naturally she would not be as 
vigorous in her mind and soul as if going about in the ordinary way. The crisis 
must have naturally affected her mentally and physically.”163 
 
The judge clearly emphasised the difficulty of childbirth, drawing on what he 
assumed were common perceptions about this event and mental instability, for the 
purpose of giving the jury a pretext to convict the accused of manslaughter on the 
ground that she lacked the mens rea for murder.164 The accused in this case, a married 
woman who had become pregnant as a result of an extra-marital relationship, claimed 
that she had fainted after giving birth alone in a barn in the middle of the night, and that 
when she recovered she found the baby lying beside her with a rope around its neck.165 
The jury convicted her of manslaughter.166 
In another case, where the accused had killed her infant within a day of being 
discharged from the County Home where she had given birth, defence counsel claimed, 
possibly in an effort to lay the basis for an insanity plea, that walking a distance of 16 
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miles carrying an infant soon after confinement (she had been walking to her estranged 
husband’s home), might have rendered the accused “so upset” that she would have 
been unable to appreciate what she was doing. Counsel added that it was not 
uncommon for a woman to become mentally unbalanced after childbirth.167 A medical 
witness at the trial of another woman (unmarried) who was accused of murdering her 
infant at birth stated during cross-examination that the circumstances involved may have 
caused a “weakness” in the accused such that she may have been led to commit 
“certain acts”. He added that a “form of mania might temporarily set in”.168 It appears that 
the juries in both of these cases were unconvinced by the evidence: both women were 
convicted of murder. 
In some cases involving murder convictions trial judges, in their recommendation 
to the Executive Council, pointed to the mental state of the offender as a justification for 
commuting the death sentence. For example, in one case where a 30-year-old 
unmarried domestic servant was found guilty of murdering her child by placing the 
newborn alive into a sandpit and covering it with stones, it was noted in the report to the 
Executive Council that the trial judge, Johnson J., stated he was: 
 
“…[S]trongly of the opinion that the sentence ought to be commuted. 
[The] prisoner appeared … from her demeanour in the dock and her 
general appearance to be a woman of weak intellect…. [H]er intellect was 
further clouded by the distressing circumstances attending the birth of the 
child.”169 
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In another case, involving a young woman of 21 who was found guilty of murdering her 
newborn infant after giving birth alone on the side of mountain on a winter’s day, the trial 
judge stated in his recommendation to the Executive Council:  
 
“In all the circumstances of the case, I strongly recommend the 
accused to mercy-the act was committed immediately after birth when 
the accused must have still been suffering from the pangs and 
subsequent prostration of child-birth. She was living at home at the 
time and she stated in her evidence that she was terrified of her 
mother.”170 
 
O’Byrne J. added that the mental condition of the offender, “who is quite a young girl”, 
could be “seriously prejudiced by her remaining for any considerable time under 
sentence of death”.171 The possibility of the accused being legally insane at the time of 
the killing seems to have arisen on the evidence at trial. During deliberations the jury, 
being unable to reach a verdict, informed the trial judge that they had difficulty with the 
state of the defendant’s mind at the time she had killed her infant. O’Byrne J. explained 
to them that the onus of proof lay on the defendant to establish that at the time she 
committed the crime she could not appreciate her actions. He added that the defence 
had failed to satisfy this requirement.172  
The Medical Prison Officer’s Report in the aforementioned case noted that the 
accused was of a “low mental calibre”.173 It appears that such observations were not 
uncommon in cases involving women accused of murdering their infants. Luddy has 
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noted that in Ireland at that time sexually promiscuous women, particularly those who 
had more than one out-of-wedlock pregnancy, were considered “feeblemined”.174 
Rattigan, in her study of the Central Criminal Court infanticide records, refers to cases 
where women had been found to be educationally or mentally deficient by medical 
officers who examined them prior to trial.175 These women were often described as 
“mentally subnormal”, as having a “weak intellect”, as being mentally “dull” or “slow”, or 
as being “simple minded”.176 As Rattigan notes, although such comments may betray a 
class bias, they may also have been made to benefit the accused.177 Only two women in 
Rattigan’s sample were found to be “mentally defective”,178 and although it seems that a 
number of women were considered mentally weak or to be of a very low educational 
standard, it does not appear, at least from the evidence referred to by Rattigan, that at 
the time of awaiting trial infanticide offenders were commonly described as being 
mentally unbalanced or disturbed due to the effect of recent childbirth.  
In summary, there is some evidence to suggest that women who killed their 
newborn infants were sometimes perceived, at least in layman’s terms and occasionally 
with the support of medical evidence, to have been mentally weak, distressed or 
disturbed, and, in such cases, the woman’s fragile or unstable mental state was often 
linked to recent childbirth. Thus, although the Irish infanticide law was not influenced by 
medical theory, it may, similar to what Ward has argued with respect to the English 
law,179 have been informed by common-sense lay notions about the vulnerability of 
women to mental disturbance in the aftermath of childbirth.180 As noted above, however, 
no explicit link is made between infanticide and mental disturbance in the background 
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documents connected with this reform. It is not clearly stated in these documents that 
the reason for lenient treatment of the infanticide offender was that her culpability was 
reduced because of her having killed while in a mentally disturbed state. Possibly, 
therefore, other extenuating factors were also thought to be relevant. 
In this regard, it seems unlikely that the understanding of infanticide mitigation 
encapsulated by the 1949 legislation was meant to be limited to situations where the 
accused had experienced a mental disturbance caused purely by the biological effects 
of parturition. Indeed, assuming that those involved in bringing forward the Infanticide 
Bill had the same objective in mind, namely to deal with the practical issue of preventing 
unnecessary murder trials,181 reformers possibly intended the infanticide law to apply 
more widely than the language of the statute could be taken to suggest. Indeed, in his 
speech to the Dáil, the Minister for Justice spoke of mental disturbances “in the 
circumstances attendant or following on the birth of the child”,182 which suggests that it 
was not childbirth itself but the wider circumstances in which birth took place that 
partially mitigated the crime of infanticide. During the Seanad debate, Senator 
Sweetman appeared to have had a wider understanding of the nature of the mental 
disturbance the Bill was intended to cover when he referred to the “many complications 
that are known to exist where … people, who are usually in poor circumstances, are 
frequently under great stress”.183 He queried why the Bill included a specific reference to 
the “effect of lactation consequent upon birth”, arguing that it appeared to be an 
unnecessary addition given that the preceding reference to the effect of birth seemed “to 
cover the ground”.184 Sweetman claimed the reference to lactation “merely giv[es] an 
example of one effect amongst, in my experience, many others which might just as well 
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be set out one after the other”, and expressed concern that problems would arise in 
applying the law as a result of the provision being drafted to include an explicit reference 
to lactation only.185 On being assured that lactation would not be the only defence, it 
being specifically included to ensure that it would not be later excluded, Senator 
Sweetman was happy to drop the matter.186 This exchange does indicate that the 
infanticide mitigation was meant to be more wide-ranging than the language of the 
statute could be taken to suggest.  
However, there is no clear recognition in the Government records and 
parliamentary debates connected with the enactment of the Infanticide Act 1949 of the 
socio-economic or cultural factors which may have been thought to mitigate the crime of 
infanticide. The legislation itself certainly does not explicitly allow for mitigation on the 
basis of such disadvantages. Indeed, the law’s requirement for individual responsibility 
would have prevented recognition of the social and other environmental causes of this 
offending.187 Further, it is unlikely that Irish lawmakers would have been willing to 
countenance the possibility of a woman’s responsibility being reduced simply because 
she had given birth in disadvantaged and distressing circumstances. Indeed, in this 
regard, it may be misleading to imply that environmental factors were the sole cause of 
infanticide. As Higginbotham notes in relation to infanticide in Victorian England, “crime 
does not inevitably result from plausible motives”.188 Hoffer and Hull state: “[e]xternal 
pressures … were certainly motives for [infanticide], but before any individual would 
undertake it, these forces had to pass through the filter of individual character and 
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perception”.189 Thus, while socio-economic difficulties certainly created the conditions for 
infanticide, and provided a very compelling motive for this crime, they did not 
automatically impel women to kill their infants: the personalities and psychological make-
ups, as well as the particular circumstances of individual women also played a part.  
If the socio-economic causes of this offending were recognised by Irish 
lawmakers, arguably this was only to the extent that it could be said that they 
contributed, as part of the wider effects of recent childbirth, to the accused having 
experienced an unbalanced or distressed mental state. The infanticide provisions were 
probably meant to capture situations where, for example, factors such as severe anxiety 
and shame over the potential consequences of giving birth to an illegitimate child, the 
resulting urge to conceal, and the intense fear of discovery, placed such a great strain 
on the woman that, at the time of the killing, the culmination of this crisis, it could be said 
that she was so mentally overwhelmed both by the physical effects of recent childbirth 
and the aforementioned factors, that her responsibility for her conduct was reduced. The 
type of situation likely to be covered by the infanticide provision was probably one 
“where, through high mental stress and abnormal circumstances of the accused, it is 
evident that it is not murder in the ordinary sense of the word”.190 As Ward suggests with 
respect to the English law, the infanticide mitigation bears a stronger relationship to 
provocation or intoxication than it does to what would constitute a medically defined 
mental disturbance.191  
 
VI. Conclusion 
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At a time when murder continued to be punished by death, and long before the adoption 
of a diminished responsibility defence, the Infanticide Act 1949 was arguably a 
significant piece of legislation. It reduced the crime of murder to infanticide where the 
victim was aged under 12 months and where the offender was the biological mother of 
the victim, provided certain mitigating conditions had been met. The infanticide reform 
was a direct consequence of the difficulties that arose from an indiscriminately harsh law 
with respect to the punishment for murder. In the Irish courts, jurors, judges and 
prosecutors all sought to circumvent the severity of the law. The ad hoc methods for 
dealing with infanticide created practical problems for the administration of justice, 
turning the murder trial in cases of maternal infanticide into a “tragic farce”.  
 In this context, it appears to have been generally agreed that the law was in need 
of reform to ensure that cases of maternal infanticide could be processed in a more 
effective way. There seems to have been little opposition to modifying the law to ensure 
more lenient treatment of mothers who murdered their infants, at least in cases where 
the accused did not deserve to be sentenced to death. Indeed, even Major de Valera, 
the only person to object to the Infanticide Bill as it passed through Parliament, was not 
opposed to providing for more lenient punishment of infanticide offenders found guilty of 
murder.192 Of course, it is evident from the records that, by the time the 1949 reform was 
initiated, punishment of infanticide was not actually a significant problem because death 
sentences in these cases were already invariably commuted. The fact is that very few 
women were actually sentenced to death for the murder of their infants during the first 
three decades of Irish independence. The real difficulty with the prevailing system was 
that, where the evidence was unambiguous with respect to the child having being 
murdered, the Attorney General had to charge with that offence.193 This meant that 
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everyone involved in the case had to prepare for a murder trial at the Central Criminal 
Court, something which proved to be a farcical exercise when it was obvious that the 
most likely outcome would be a conviction, usually on the basis of a guilty plea, for 
manslaughter or concealment of birth, or a full acquittal.194  
 The death sentence also appears to have been routinely commuted in other 
murder cases and evidently there were wider issues with respect to the use of capital 
punishment in Ireland. Infanticide, however, was the only form of murder singled out for 
reform. There were probably a number of reasons for this. The comparative frequency 
with which the courts encountered the crime of maternal infanticide, the consistency 
between these cases in terms of the circumstances involved, and the fact that a verdict 
of murder was rarely returned and the capital sentence was never carried out, are all 
factors which may have created a sense of urgency with respect to the problem of 
infanticide. In contrast to other cases of murder where the death penalty was reprieved, 
infanticide could easily constitute a separate category of homicide: it was readily 
distinguishable from other kinds of murder on the basis of the age of victim, the sex of 
the offender, and the relationship between the victim and offender. Given that infanticide 
was almost always committed by women or “young girls”, it is also possible that a sense 
of chivalry or paternalism motivated the reform.195 The fact that infanticide had already 
been subject to law reform in England and that the English approach provided a very 
neat solution to the problem were probably highly relevant considerations. 
The Irish legislature essentially adopted the English law and in that sense 
legislating for infanticide in Ireland was a fairly straightforward matter. Indeed, the 
infanticide proposal seems to have attracted very little criticism. Given the conservative, 
nationalist and Catholic context of Ireland at that time, this may appear surprising. For 
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example, efforts to provide for legal adoption and free health care for mothers and 
children caused significant controversy,196 yet the enactment of a “liberal” English law 
which ostensibly reduced the killing of an infant to a lower category of homicide seems 
to have attracted little dissent.  
In this regard, it might be suggested that the response to infanticide in the Irish 
Free State, and the eventual enactment of the 1949 statute, demonstrate that there was 
in reality little regard for infant life, particularly illegitimate infant life, among Irish court 
and Government officials.197 However, the fact that Parliament enacted a law which 
rendered maternal infant-murder a lesser form of homicide where certain mitigating 
conditions had been met does not per se indicate a lack of regard for infant life. 
Arguably, the reason for differential lenient treatment of mothers was not that the victim 
was an (illegitimate) infant, but that the offender was a woman who had killed in 
circumstances that were taken to lower her legal culpability, and who, therefore, did not 
deserve to be sentenced to death, or indeed severely punished. The infanticide 
legislation was specific only to the biological mothers of infants; the focus of the new law 
was arguably on the offender, not the victim. Indeed, though not an objective of the 
reform,198 the Infanticide Act, by classifying infanticide as a serious homicide offence and 
emphasising, in principle at least, that the killing of an infant by its mother was murder 
unless extenuating circumstances were involved, may have served to curtail any 
possible diminution of the seriousness of this crime or the value of infant life as a result 
of the customary lenient justice being practised.199  
It appears that Irish infanticide reformers were very sensitive to the risk that by 
formally acknowledging that infanticide could be treated more leniently than other 
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murders, the sanctity of infant life and the deterrent effect of the law might be 
diminished. This proved to be a significant factor in the Irish reform. In this regard, the 
English law was not adopted in Ireland without modification, as the Minister for Justice 
was careful to point out when introducing the Bill to both Houses of the Oireachtas: the 
Irish law differed from the English model in that it did more to protect the sanctity of 
infant life. The inclusion of s.1(1), inserted at the request of the Cabinet, was the only 
way in which drafters of the Irish infanticide law showed any legislative initiative. The 
archival records suggest that the inclusion of this provision was most likely a result of a 
consultation with the Archbishop of Dublin, who, it seems, may have informed the 
Government that he would not oppose the Bill provided it was amended to take proper 
account of the importance of the sanctity of infant life by emphasising that the crime at 
hand would continue to be treated as murder unless mitigating circumstances were 
shown. Though the evidence is not conclusive in this regard, the records consulted 
strongly suggest that the Archbishop made certain recommendations to the Minister for 
Justice and that his input was crucial to the Cabinet’s decision to seek a redrafting of the 
Bill, and to the eventual inclusion of the s.1(1) provision. 
Interestingly, although the support of the Catholic Church was deemed important 
to those involved in drafting the Infanticide Bill, the views of medical professionals 
appear to have been considered wholly irrelevant. The medical rationale from the 
English law was adopted in Ireland without any consideration of medical expertise on the 
matter or consultation with the profession. Indeed, Irish reformers demonstrated a 
mixture of indifference to and fear of the views of the medical profession and, moreover, 
an attitude that medical agreement was not crucial to the legitimacy of this legislative 
endeavour. Possibly, the reluctance to consult with medical experts was due to a belief 
that they would seek to impose rigid medical definitions which would have made it more 
difficult to apply the law in the kinds of situation intended to be covered by the reform. 
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In this regard, it does not seem that Irish lawmakers meant to enshrine a bio-
determinist understanding of infanticide in the 1949 legislation. External socio-economic 
and cultural factors, in particular the impact on the accused of becoming pregnant in 
culturally unacceptable circumstances, were probably considered relevant to the 
mitigation framework, at least to the extent that, as part of the wider effects of birth, they 
could be said to have caused the accused to have experienced an unbalanced mental 
state at the time of the killing. Although the meaning and scope of the mitigation 
provided for were not discussed in the sources considered, it appears from what was 
said in the records consulted that socio-economic factors were not to be ignored. 
However, feminist criticism of infanticide legislation is not wholly without merit. The 
infanticide law did fail to recognise more explicitly the socio-economic causes of 
infanticide, appearing to identify mental instability caused by biological processes, rather 
than socio-economic adversity, as an explanation for this crime. As Smith argues with 
respect to the Victorian approach to maternal infanticide, although the lay form of 
insanity which was commonly accepted at trial did encompass a social account of the 
crime, an insanity verdict served to disguise the true causes of the offence and 
“detracted from examining women’s position in relation to power and wealth”.200 Thus, 
apart from reinforcing, and potentially fostering, sexist attitudes to female criminality, the 
failure to address the socio-economic and cultural context of infanticide in the 1949 
statute meant that the real reasons for this crime were denied, or at the very least 
disguised.201 However, an express recognition of the socio-economic explanation for 
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infanticide would have been impossible; such a radical move would have most likely 
ensured the defeat of this legislation in Parliament.202  
As previously noted, the infanticide law was essentially a legal mechanism by 
which to formally provide for lenient treatment of women who killed their infants by 
avoiding the practical difficulties entailed in dealing with these cases under ordinary 
murder provisions.203 The key reason for this reform was practical.204 The supposed 
medical basis adopted provided an apparently convincing and sound rationale for 
facilitating different treatment of this category of killer, but it was not the reason for 
treating these offenders leniently;205 nor, it is argued here, was it how lenient provision 
was to be made for infanticide offenders in practice. Reformers showed so little interest 
in the medical aspect of the Bill it is arguable that they viewed it only as a minor matter 
in this reform. The key issue was to ensure that women could be treated more leniently 
by the law and that compassion could be provided in a formal and legitimate manner.206 
Reformers were not interested in the medical aspect of the Bill because it required no 
explanation: it was clear to all what the language was supposed to cover and what the 
new law was intended to achieve.  
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TABLE A. CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE: ANNUAL ABSTRACTS: NUMBER OF INDICTABLE 
OFFENCES KNOWN TO THE POLICE (MURDER OF PERSONS AGED ABOVE ONE YEAR; 
NUMBER OF INFANTS AGED ONE YEAR AND UNDER; CONCEALMENT OF BIRTH), 1927–1949. 
 Total Number of Crimes Known to the Police: 
Year Murder of Persons 
Aged  
over One Year 
Murder of Infants 
Aged  
One Year and Under 
Concealment of  
Birth 
1927 9 19 41 
1928 12 10 49 
1929 8 13 50 
1930 6 10 48 
1931 10 7 58 
1932 9 4 38 
1933 9 10 38 
1934 3 4 38 
1935 8 9 29 
1936 10 6 44 
1937 6 6 32 
1938 9 5 34 
1939 5 5 36 
1940 7 5 36 
1941 7 2 33 
1942 7 1 39 
1943 10 3 39 
1944 7 1 30 
1945 3 3 39 
1946 7 1 25 
1947 3 0 25 
1948 11 6 27 
1949 1 5 28 
Total 167 135 856 
 
 
